# kaal:claim:2097160-022

**Claim.** Early triggers in executive compensation improve the signaling of default risk by producing the signal while default risk is present but still somewhat remote.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Early triggers for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation packages may increase and optimize the signaling of default risk at a time when the risk of default is present but still somewhat remote.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), V.B.2 The Benefits of Early Triggers, page 44

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, contingent-capital, systemic-risk

**Keywords.** default-risk, signaling, early-trigger, systemic-risk

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-021

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