# kaal:claim:2097160-024

**Claim.** Before conversion, executives holding securities with long-term maturities and coupon payments have incentives to manage the company with debt-holders' interests in mind.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- before any conversion into equity
- strength depends on the proportion of debt in the package

**Source quote.**

> Because executives would be holding securities with long-term maturities and coupon payments, executives would have incentives to manage the company with the interests of debt-holders in mind.184

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), V.B.2 The Benefits of Early Triggers, page 46

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Topics.** ai-and-agents

**Keywords.** interest-alignment, inside-debt, creditor-centered-approach, long-termism

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