# kaal:claim:2097160-028

**Claim.** Where rules and regulatory guidance are absent, fiduciary duties are the only constraint on executives, and existing fiduciary duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse when the payoff is substantial.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- no rules or regulatory guidance on contingent convertible bond design and issuance
- substantial payoff to executives

**Source quote.**

> Without rules and regulatory guidance regarding the design and issuance of contingent convertible bonds, SIFI executives may only be curtailed by their fiduciary duties. Existing fiduciary duties could prove insufficient to limit opportunism and abuse if the payoff for executives is substantial.193

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), V.C Design Features to Avoid Abuse, page 49

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Failure mode.** Fiduciary duties insufficient against large payoffs  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** corporate-governance

**Keywords.** fiduciary-duty, abuse, regulatory-gap, opportunism

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.