# kaal:claim:2097160-038

**Claim.** Trigger designs that work well in institutions with the traditional mix of debt-holders and shareholders may be suboptimal once executives themselves hold contingent convertible bonds.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- executives hold debt instruments in the form of contingent convertible bonds

**Source quote.**

> Trigger designs that may work well in financial institutions with the traditional mix of debt- holders and shareholders may be suboptimal if executives also hold debt instruments in the form of contingent convertible bonds.275

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), VI.C The Impact of Ownership Characteristics on Trigger Design, page 68

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Failure mode.** Ownership blind trigger design  (family: trigger-design-failure)

**Topics.** contingent-capital, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** ownership-characteristics, trigger-design, contingent-capital, corporate-governance

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