# kaal:claim:2097160-040

**Claim.** An early trigger design for contingent convertible bonds in executive compensation enables earlier signaling of default risk, increases incentives for creditors and shareholders to monitor, and increases executives' incentives to lower risk-taking.

**Type.** design  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Contingent convertible bonds with an early trigger design enable earlier signaling of default risk; they provide increased incentives for monitoring by creditors and shareholders as well as incentives for executives to lower their risk-taking.282

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation* (2012), VII. Conclusion, page 69

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Contingent Capital in Executive Compensation (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2097160

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `1e1f8aa246bce19f4658dbceb455c7c2a272aa5d63a9e9bdaa46a3a5a87680fc` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Contingent%20Capital%20in%20Executive%20Compensation.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, risk-and-incentives, compliance, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** early-trigger, default-risk, monitoring, risk-taking, corporate-governance

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-032

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