# kaal:claim:2150377-018

**Claim.** Managers who avoided registration by restructuring, for example by changing organizational form or assets under management, are practically and administratively very difficult to identify, so the population that adapted away from the rule remains largely unobservable to researchers.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- identification of advisers who altered structure or AUM to avoid registration

**Source quote.**

> Identifying hedge fund managers who had been exposed to the treatment and decided to avoid the treatment, by changing their organizational structure, AUM, et cetera, proved practically and administratively very difficult and would have resulted in a very small sample size for the control group.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act* (2012), C. Selection Bias

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act (2012). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2150377

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `0b58bb409cac7674d78515f5374096f9a349de3bbd1983c990e0edc85a635a09` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202012%20-%20Hedge%20Fund%20Manager%20Registration%20Under%20the%20Dodd-Frank%20Act.pdf

**Failure mode.** regulatory-avoiders-unobservable  (family: sample-and-selection-bias)

**Topics.** regulatory-failure, securities-law

**Keywords.** regulatory-avoidance, research-design, unobservable-population, selection-bias, registration

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