# kaal:claim:2267560-003

**Claim.** Dynamic regulation as part of institutional design in the evolution of law has not been systematically analyzed, despite an existing economics literature applying dynamic regulation to telecommunications, learning by doing, and principal-agent problems.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** evidenced

**Source quote.**

> Dynamic regulation as part of institutional design in the evolution of law has not been systematically analyzed.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), I. Introduction, page 3

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Topics.** dynamic-regulation, institutional-design

**Keywords.** dynamic-regulation, literature-gap, institutional-design, evolution-of-law

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-045

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