# kaal:claim:2267560-010

**Claim.** Even institutional arrangements that produce optimal governance solutions generate solutions that become suboptimal over time, necessitating rule revision, updating, and revocation.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** asserted

**Holds when.**

- passage of time and changing circumstances

**Source quote.**

> Even if institutional arrangements produce optimal governance solutions, these solutions can become suboptimal over time, necessitating rule revision, updating, and revocation.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), II.2 Feedback Effects, page 5

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Failure mode.** decay of optimal governance solutions over time  (family: rule-obsolescence-and-ossification)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** optimal-rules, regulatory-obsolescence, rule-revision, institutional-design

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-013
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-032

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.