# kaal:claim:2267560-015

**Claim.** Under dynamic regulation a presumption of reform feasibility is unnecessary because the feedback effect makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete, curtailing centralized planning and minimizing unintended actions.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> A presumption of reform feasibility for a given regulatory environment is unnecessary because the feedback effect in dynamic regulation makes ad-hoc decisions obsolete.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), II.3 Dynamic Regulation as Piecemeal Social Engineering, page 6

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Topics.** dynamic-regulation, institutional-design, decentralization

**Keywords.** dynamic-regulation, feedback-effects, centralized-planning, regulatory-reform

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