# kaal:claim:2267560-022

**Claim.** Parties subject to informal rules signal their preferences and efficient solutions to the public rulemaker, so informal rules and practices supply additional information that modifies rulemakers' actions and improves rulemaking.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Parties who are subject to informal rules signal their preferences as well as efficient solutions to the public rulemaker. Informal rules and practices therefore provide additional information that can help modify the actions of rulemakers and improve rulemaking.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), III.1 Formal vs. Informal Rules, page 8

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Topics.** dynamic-regulation, institutional-design

**Keywords.** informal-rules, signaling, public-rulemaking, feedback-effects

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