# kaal:claim:2267560-029

**Claim.** Competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, but it nevertheless provides incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory solutions from other jurisdictions.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> the competition between legislators does not necessarily provide a feedback process in the sense of cooperation, (Kirchner, Painter and Kaal 2005; Carbonara and Parisi 2008; Kerber 2000; Heine and Kerber 2002), it can nevertheless provide incentives for public rulemakers to consider regulatory

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), III.2 Private vs. Public Rulemaking, page 9

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Topics.** economics, law-and-legal-systems, institutional-design

**Keywords.** regulatory-competition, inter-jurisdictional, feedback-effects, legislators

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/5886442-030

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