# kaal:claim:2267560-031

**Claim.** Consumer opt-out from existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker: when a critical mass of opt-outs signals that a different rule may be optimal, it triggers a modification of the rulemaker's next action.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- a critical mass of consumer opt-outs occurs

**Source quote.**

> The consumer opt-out of existing rules creates a feedback effect for the public rulemaker and triggers a modification of the public rulemaker's next action in the rulemaking process.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), III.2 Private vs. Public Rulemaking, page 9

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design, dynamic-regulation

**Keywords.** consumer-choice, opt-out, feedback-effects, public-rulemaking

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-037

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.