# kaal:claim:2267560-036

**Claim.** Rules, especially in financial regulation, are mostly enacted when it is politically opportune rather than when appropriate information for rulemaking is available.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- financial regulation in particular

**Source quote.**

> Financial crises throughout history (Rheinhart and Rogoff 2011) have demonstrated that rules are mostly enacted, especially in the context of financial regulation, when it is politically opportune (Coffee 2012), not when appropriate information for rulemaking is available.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, page 11

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Failure mode.** politically timed rather than information timed rulemaking  (family: regulatory-lag)

**Topics.** dynamic-regulation

**Keywords.** political-expediency, financial-regulation, crisis-driven-rulemaking, information-timing

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