# kaal:claim:2267560-038

**Claim.** During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, temporarily overcoming the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- during and after crises

**Source quote.**

> During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups so as to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process (Ostrom 1990).

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, page 11

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Topics.** innovation, institutional-design, dynamic-regulation

**Keywords.** political-entrepreneurs, collective-action, crisis-driven-rulemaking, special-interests

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-022

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.