# kaal:claim:2267560-039

**Claim.** The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking are likely to persist, which makes alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking more relevant.

**Type.** predictive  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> The collective action problem and the cyclical nature of rulemaking (Coffee 2012) are likely to persist, making alternatives and supplements to existing institutional designs for rulemaking even more relevant.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework* (2013), IV.1 Optimizing the Learning Process, page 11

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Evolution of Law Dynamic Regulation in a New Institutional Economics Framework (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2267560

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `7ecc9dd1826121a95bf252476cdaa1c8737ad8079e12caf66c4342ffae7af8af` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Evolution%20of%20Law%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20in%20a%20New%20Institutional%20Economics%20Framework.pdf

**Topics.** dynamic-regulation, institutional-design

**Keywords.** cyclical-rulemaking, collective-action, institutional-design, dynamic-regulation

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-028

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