# kaal:claim:2273857-019

**Claim.** The bounded rationality of public rulemakers aggravates shock conditions during rulemaking, because rulemakers satisfy their own constituencies rather than all affected parties and are therefore more willing to act on incomplete information.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- public rulemakers accountable to particular constituencies

**Source quote.**

> The bounded rationality of public rulemakers—who are satisfying their respective constituencies rather than all affected parties and, therefore, may be more willing to act in an environment of incomplete information—can aggravate shock conditions during the rulemaking process.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), II. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, page 11

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, dynamic-regulation

**Keywords.** bounded-rationality, incomplete-information, public-choice, rulemaking

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-005
- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-010

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.