# kaal:claim:2273857-021

**Claim.** In the competition to shape financial policy through rulemaking, small and well organized special interest groups such as the financial industry dominate latent groups such as dispersed investors.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- ordinary, non-crisis periods

**Source quote.**

> In the competition to shape policies and attain the most favorable conditions for themselves via rulemaking, small and well- organized special interest groups (such as the financial industry) dominate latent groups (such as dispersed investors).

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), II. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, page 12

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design, regulatory-failure, economics

**Keywords.** collective-action-problem, interest-groups, regulatory-capture, political-economy

**Related claims.**

- specializes: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-037
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-017
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2740477-028

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