# kaal:claim:2273857-022

**Claim.** During and after crises, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing otherwise disinterested latent groups, which temporarily overcomes the predominance of special interest groups in rulemaking.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- during and immediately after a crisis

**Source quote.**

> During and after crises, however, political entrepreneurs assume the transaction costs of organizing the otherwise disinterested latent groups to temporarily overcome the predominance of special interest groups in the rulemaking process.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), II. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation, page 12

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Topics.** innovation, institutional-design, economics

**Keywords.** political-entrepreneurs, collective-action-problem, transaction-costs, regulatory-cycles

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-038
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-004

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.