# kaal:claim:2273857-026

**Claim.** The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and produces suboptimal regulatory outcomes with long-term implications for financial markets and the economy.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- rulemaking conducted cyclically under incomplete information

**Source quote.**

> The cyclical nature of public rulemaking under conditions of incomplete information and bounded rationality is costly and can produce suboptimal regulatory outcomes, often with long-term implications for financial markets and the economy.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), II.2 Regulatory Sine Curve, page 15

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Failure mode.** cyclical rulemaking cost  (family: rule-obsolescence-and-ossification)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, regulatory-failure

**Keywords.** regulatory-cycles, incomplete-information, bounded-rationality, regulatory-failure

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2267560-005
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-003

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.