# kaal:claim:2273857-030

**Claim.** In the absence of crises the intensity of regulation diminishes, because regulators cannot commit to long-term regulatory strategies and instead fall back on private strategies such as self-regulation to overcome resource constraints.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- non-crisis periods
- regulators facing resource constraints

**Source quote.**

> In the absence of crises, however, the intensity of regulation diminishes because regulators are unable to commit to long-term regulatory strategies and instead use private strategies like self-regulation to overcome resource constraints.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), II.2 Regulatory Sine Curve, page 15

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Failure mode.** regulator commitment failure  (family: enforcement-gap)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** self-regulation, regulatory-intensity, resource-constraints, regulatory-commitment

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