# kaal:claim:2273857-039

**Claim.** In the current regulatory environment the relationship between the regulatory sine curve and the common elements of banking and financial crises is suboptimal, because regulatory activity only begins its ascent once bank failures are already increasing.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- current regulatory framework without dynamic elements

**Source quote.**

> In the current regulatory environment a suboptimal relationship exists between the regulatory sine curve and the common elements of banking and financial crises.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), II.3 Financial Crises and the Regulatory Sine Curve, page 21

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Failure mode.** phase mismatch between regulation and crises  (family: regulatory-lag)

**Topics.** regulatory-failure

**Keywords.** regulatory-sine-curve, regulatory-timing, financial-crises, regulatory-failure

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.