# kaal:claim:2273857-058

**Claim.** Managers are incentivized to manage their institutions so as to avoid contingent capital triggers, and that incentive itself can optimize the governance of financial institutions.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- CoCos are outstanding with credible trigger terms

**Source quote.**

> Managers are incentivized to manage their respective entities to avoid CoCo triggers, which can help optimize governance of financial institutions.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), IV. Implementation, page 28

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, risk-and-incentives, governance-design, corporate-governance, dynamic-regulation

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, managerial-incentives, corporate-governance, dynamic-regulation

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-004
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1998455-040

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.