# kaal:claim:2273857-059

**Claim.** A contingent capital triggering event signals that management was unable to manage the entity so as to avoid the trigger, and therefore signals to rulemakers that regulatory action may be needed, information regulators cannot obtain by monitoring debt to equity and capital adequacy ratios alone.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- a CoCo trigger is actually reached in a specific institution

**Source quote.**

> While regulators have other means of monitoring debt/equity ratios and capital adequacy ratios, a CoCo triggering event signals that management was unable to manage the entity to avoid the triggering event, suggesting that regulatory action may be needed.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), IV. Implementation, page 28

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Topics.** contingent-capital, institutional-design

**Keywords.** contingent-capital, signaling, institution-specific-information, regulatory-action

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-027
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2957645-025

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.