# kaal:claim:2273857-064

**Claim.** Corporate integrity agreements improve corporate governance because the ease of reopened prosecution, increased government scrutiny, and the potential for crippling penalties improve boards' and managements' knowledge of pertinent issues in the institution and its monitoring.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- institution operating under a corporate integrity agreement

**Source quote.**

> The ease of prosecution, the increased scrutiny by the government, and the potential for crippling penalties can improve boards' and managements' knowledge of pertinent issues in the institution and its monitoring. CIAs can, thus, improve corporate governance.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry* (2013), IV. Implementation, page 30

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation of the Financial Services Industry (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2273857

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `e7cb3dea40593135acc99a9b00690138fe01020514ebf388f5140e1b0e59e82a` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202013%20-%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20the%20Financial%20Services%20Industry.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** corporate-integrity-agreements, corporate-governance, government-scrutiny, compliance

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-016
- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2317580-032

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.
