# kaal:claim:2317580-016

**Claim.** Once a CIA has been executed it is much easier for the government to reopen a case than to pursue a new one, and this ease of further prosecution, combined with increased OIG scrutiny and the threat of crippling penalties, substantially affects board knowledge, monitoring, and management.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- companies operating under an executed CIA

**Source quote.**

> Once a CIA has been executed, it is much easier for the government to reopen a case than to pursue a new one.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, *The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties* (2013), III.2 Characteristics, page 11

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Malay%20-%202013%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20Corporate%20Integrity%20Agreements%20in%20the%20Expansion%20of%20Fiduciary%20Duties.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** prosecution-costs, oig-scrutiny, board-monitoring, corporate-integrity-agreements

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-064

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