# kaal:claim:2317580-026

**Claim.** Because CIAs combine contractual and public enforcement, with the OIG enforcing them and private rights of action also available, they are more than contractual arrangements, and a breach of a CIA may be treated like a breach of law for purposes of the duty of care.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- CIAs enforceable by the OIG and, under Delaware law, by courts via derivative suit

**Source quote.**

> Because of the combination of enforcement mechanisms, CIAs are more than contractual arrangements. A breach of a CIA may be treated like a breach of law for purposes of the duty of care.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, *The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties* (2013), IV. The Role of CIAs in Expanding Fiduciary Duties, page 14

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Elizabeth R. Malay, The Role of Corporate Integrity Agreements in the Expansion of Fiduciary Duties (2013). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317580

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `50973e1e820aef47a4e7ffdbdcb513d03f1845643fcf4fa5910e9528a0b7dac2` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Malay%20-%202013%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20Corporate%20Integrity%20Agreements%20in%20the%20Expansion%20of%20Fiduciary%20Duties.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** hybrid-enforcement, duty-of-care, breach-of-law, derivative-suits

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