# kaal:claim:2470008-013

**Claim.** The absence of financial market repercussions from the Amaranth failure suggests that indirect regulation of private funds, achieved by having regulators press banks to limit leverage extended to their fund clients, worked.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- post LTCM supervisory practice of monitoring fund clients through bank leverage limits
- the Amaranth failure in 2006

**Source quote.**

> The lack of financial market repercussion after the Amaranth failure seems to suggest that this approach was successful.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act* (2014), II. Systemic Risk of Private Funds

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, The Systemic Risk of Private Funds after the Dodd-Frank Act (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2470008

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `5f68a401c935527d89658171e9b48a4d186710459aaf2bdbead755507394e8c9` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Systemic%20Risk%20of%20Private%20Funds%20after%20the%20Dodd-Frank%20Act.pdf

**Topics.** private-funds

**Keywords.** indirect-regulation, leverage-limits, amaranth, counterparty-discipline, hedge-funds

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2714974-031

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.