# kaal:claim:2486570-001

**Claim.** The increasing use of non prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements has allowed federal prosecutors to expand their traditional role incrementally, marking a shift in prosecutorial culture away from an ex post focus on punishment toward an ex ante emphasis on compliance.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> has enabled federal prosecutors to incrementally expand their traditional role, exemplifying a shift in prosecutorial culture from an ex-post focus on punish- ment to an ex-ante emphasis on compliance.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), I. INTRODUCTION, page 2

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** deferred-prosecution, prosecutorial-discretion, corporate-compliance, corporate-governance

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