# kaal:claim:2486570-004

**Claim.** Once prosecutors have investigated and identified corporate wrongdoing, non and deferred prosecution agreements let them avoid an expensive trial against a sophisticated and well funded corporate defendant, which is one reason both sides have strong incentives to settle.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> prosecutors have investigated and identified corporate wrongdoing, they can use N/DPAs to avoid an expensive trial against a sophisticated and well-funded cor- porate defendant.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), I. INTRODUCTION, page 3

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, compliance, law-and-legal-systems

**Keywords.** prosecutorial-incentives, deferred-prosecution, litigation-costs, corporate-defendants

**Related claims.**

- extended_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2831040-020

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