# kaal:claim:2486570-005

**Claim.** Prosecutors favor non and deferred prosecution agreements because those agreements avoid the uncertainty of potentially catastrophic collateral consequences for the company, unlike an indictment.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> Second, prosecutors favor N/DPAs because they do not entail the uncertainty of potentially catastrophic collateral consequences for the company.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), I. INTRODUCTION, page 4

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, compliance

**Keywords.** prosecutorial-incentives, collateral-consequences, deferred-prosecution, corporate-indictment

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2273857-063

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