# kaal:claim:2486570-008

**Claim.** At the pre charging stage the government typically holds extraordinary bargaining power, which lets it extract fines and sanctions comparable to those following a criminal conviction while avoiding the risk and cost of trial.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- applies at the pre charging stage

**Source quote.**

> The government typically has extraordinary bargaining power at the pre-charging stage, enabling it to extract fines and sanctions similar to those from a criminal conviction69 without the risk and cost of a trial.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), II. CORPORATE NON- AND DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, page 11

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Topics.** compliance

**Keywords.** bargaining-power, prosecutorial-leverage, deferred-prosecution, sanctions

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