# kaal:claim:2486570-022

**Claim.** If leading corporations in an industry are bound by substantially similar agreements, the government's privileged access to information and its continuing oversight beyond the agreement term can make business and governance practices in that industry change lastingly.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- requires the DOJ to target one industry with substantially similar or overlapping N/DPA terms

**Source quote.**

> Given the government's privileged access to information and continuing government oversight, even after the N/DPA term expires, business and governance practices in that industry could encounter lasting change.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), VI.B. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOARDS, MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL COUNSEL, page 55

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, corporate-governance

**Keywords.** industry-targeting, regulatory-change, corporate-governance, prosecutorial-oversight

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