# kaal:claim:2486570-023

**Claim.** Because the board changes mandated by non and deferred prosecution agreements consist largely of additional reporting obligations and committee reform rather than removal of officers or directors, those reforms alone may not create sufficient incentives for boards and management to improve governance and avoid execution of an agreement.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> These reforms alone may not create sufficient incentives for boards and management to improve governance and avoid N/DPA execution.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), VI.B. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOARDS, MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL COUNSEL, page 55

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Failure mode.** insufficient-board-incentives  (family: board-and-oversight-failure)

**Topics.** corporate-governance, risk-and-incentives, governance-design

**Keywords.** board-changes, incentives, deterrence, corporate-governance

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