# kaal:claim:2486570-030

**Claim.** Governance reform delivered through non and deferred prosecution agreements is comparatively cheap for corporations because it adversely affects only a small number of board and management positions.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> N/DPA-related governance re- form is relatively "cheap" for corporations because comparatively few board and management positions are adversely affected.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), VI.B. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOARDS, MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL COUNSEL, page 57

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, compliance

**Keywords.** regulatory-supplement, governance-reform, cost-of-compliance, corporate-insiders

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