# kaal:claim:2486570-033

**Claim.** In the long run, increased regulation by prosecution may be able to offset many of the shortcomings of legislative governance reform, even though it is less predictable than legislation.

**Type.** predictive  **Support.** speculative

**Source quote.**

> In the long run, however, increased regulation by prosecution may be able to offset many of the shortcomings of leg- islative governance reforms.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), VI.B. IMPLICATIONS FOR BOARDS, MANAGEMENT, AND LEGAL COUNSEL, page 58

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, dynamic-regulation, governance-design

**Keywords.** regulation-by-prosecution, legislative-reform, dynamic-regulation, governance-reform

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.
