# kaal:claim:2486570-040

**Claim.** Corporate governance provisions in non and deferred prosecution agreements increased significantly over the decade to 2013, raising prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to unprecedented levels.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- based on all publicly available N/DPAs from 1993 to 2013

**Source quote.**

> find that corporate governance provisions in N/DPAs significantly increased in the last decade, boosting prosecutors' influence over corporate governance to un- precedented levels.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, *The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20* (2014), VII. CONCLUSION, page 59

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8c3981c9a55d8a3fe59a01660584eebc3feb3fb9109ca65344095bebe4ae49a4` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Lacine%20-%202014%20-%20The%20Effect%20of%20Deferred%20and%20Non-Prosecution%20Agreements%20on%20Corporate%20Governance%20Evidence%20from%201993-20.pdf

**Topics.** governance-design, corporate-governance, empirical-evidence, compliance

**Keywords.** prosecutorial-influence, corporate-governance, empirical-findings, enforcement-trends

**Related claims.**

- supported_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-024

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