# kaal:claim:2715083-023

**Claim.** The inherent conflict of interest facing an adviser who simultaneously runs a mutual fund and a hedge fund is an important limiting factor on the continued rise of side-by-side management.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- side-by-side management of a mutual fund and a hedge fund by the same adviser

**Source quote.**

> An important limiting factor in the steady rise of side-by-side management is the inherent conflict of interest for the investment manager (SEC (2003), Chen & Chen (2009) and Cici et al. (2010)).

**From.** Kaal, *Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds* (2016), IV.1 Investor Preferences, page 12

**Cite as.** Kaal, Confluence of Mutual and Private Funds (2016). SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2715083

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `b5c92186260d4a8499a14f81ee24ace093b24e7740af3effcd1c526fa4fa221e` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202016%20-%20Confluence%20of%20Mutual%20and%20Private%20Funds.pdf

**Failure mode.** Side-by-side management conflict  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** corporate-governance, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** side-by-side-management, conflicts-of-interest, fiduciary-duty, adviser-incentives

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.
