# kaal:claim:2740477-019

**Claim.** Regulatory timing under disruptive innovation is a two sided risk: regulate too early and innovation is inhibited, withhold regulation too long and consumers and markets are harmed once regulatory inertia has formed around the disruptive product or service.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- regulation of a disruptive product or service

**Source quote.**

> If policy makers regulate too early, they risk inhibiting innovation; if they withhold regulation too long, they may harm consumers and markets if regulatory inertia has set in around the disruptive product or service.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, *Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation* (2016), IV.3. Timing, page 20

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Vermeulen%20-%202016%20-%20Venture%20Capital%20as%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20Disruptive%20Innovation.pdf

**Failure mode.** Timing dilemma of early versus late regulation  (family: regulatory-lag)

**Topics.** innovation

**Keywords.** regulatory-timing, regulatory-inertia, disruptive-innovation, policy-tradeoff

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-021

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