# kaal:claim:2740477-024

**Claim.** Accepting suboptimal rules temporarily buys rule certainty and predictability but guarantees a later cycle of revision, amendment, and repeal, so rulemakers trade short term certainty for a costly correction process.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- rulemakers knowingly accept suboptimalities tied to unknown future contingencies

**Source quote.**

> Temporary acceptance of suboptimal rules increases temporary rule certainty and predictability, but it also precipitates the inevitable need for rule revision, amendments, and repeals

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, *Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation* (2016), IV.4. Unknown Future Contingencies, page 22

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Vermeulen%20-%202016%20-%20Venture%20Capital%20as%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20Disruptive%20Innovation.pdf

**Failure mode.** Deferred suboptimality correction cycle  (family: rule-obsolescence-and-ossification)

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** rule-revision, regulatory-cycles, certainty-tradeoff, stable-rules

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