# kaal:claim:2740477-027

**Claim.** The collective action problem of rulemaking, the problems of trial and error rulemaking, and regulatory cycles all derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules rather than from independent causes.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Source quote.**

> The collective action problem of rulemaking, problems associated with trial-and-error rulemaking, and problems associated with regulatory cycles derive largely from the nature of stable and presumptively optimal rules.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, *Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation* (2016), V. Dynamic Regulation as a Regulatory Supplement, page 24

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Venture Capital as Dynamic Regulation of Disruptive Innovation (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2740477

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `c72871b76fa2ad5a8a69ee8d3defc8f64e624be9052ce763e79cf6c58883f726` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Vermeulen%20-%202016%20-%20Venture%20Capital%20as%20Dynamic%20Regulation%20of%20Disruptive%20Innovation.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** collective-action, stable-rules, regulatory-cycles, root-cause

**Related claims.**

- restated_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2808132-028
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/kaal-2014-dynamicregulationviagove-008

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.