# kaal:claim:2748096-007

**Claim.** Post-LTCM counterparty credit risk management, in which regulators pressed banks to monitor and limit the leverage of their hedge fund clients, appears to have worked: the Amaranth failure produced no financial market repercussions.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- post-1998 regulatory environment
- inference drawn from a single episode, the Amaranth failure

**Source quote.**

> The lack of financial market repercussions after the Amaranth failure seems to suggest that this approach has been successful.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, *Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk* (2016), THE DEBATE ON HEDGE FUNDS' SYSTEMIC RISK, page 4

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy A. Krause, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk (2016). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2748096

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `8f30260f2c1db728b45c4f3b9b7c64358cf9d3217277bc3c63a910c32f87b508` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Krause%20-%202016%20-%20Hedge%20Funds%20and%20Systemic%20Risk.pdf

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, systemic-risk, compliance

**Keywords.** counterparty-risk, leverage-limits, bank-monitoring, amaranth, ltcm

**Related claims.**

- supports: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-011
- contests: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-028
- supports: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/1806252-029

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.