# kaal:claim:2922176-007

**Claim.** Reforms that increase executive accountability to shareholders and increase shareholder control over executives do not solve the problem of corporate short-term focus.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- post-2000 shareholder-empowerment reforms

**Source quote.**

> Increasing the accountability of corporate executives to shareholders and increasing shareholder control over executives does not address the problem of short-term focus.

**From.** Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, *The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies* (2017), III. Corporate Governance Reform, page 13

**Cite as.** Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Fenwick%20et%20al.%20-%202017%20-%20The%20%E2%80%98Unmediated%E2%80%99%20and%20%E2%80%98Tech-Driven%E2%80%99%20Corporate%20Governance%20of%20Today%27s%20Winning%20Companies.pdf

**Failure mode.** shareholder empowerment misfire  (family: agency-cost-and-managerial-opportunism)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, corporate-governance, governance-design

**Keywords.** short-termism, shareholder-primacy, corporate-governance-reform, accountability

**Related claims.**

- supported_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3808859-003

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.