# kaal:claim:2922176-014

**Claim.** Stewardship pressures push companies toward an unhealthy focus on short-term dividends and share buybacks designed to please the stock market, the opposite of the long-term orientation the codes intend.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- companies subject to institutional investor stewardship pressure

**Source quote.**

> Indeed, stewardship pressures often expose companies to an unhealthy focus on short-term dividends and share buybacks designed to please the stock market.

**From.** Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, *The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies* (2017), IV. Limits of Corporate Governance Reform, page 20

**Cite as.** Mark Fenwick, Wulf A. Kaal, Erik P. M. Vermeulen, The ‘Unmediated’ and ‘Tech-Driven’ Corporate Governance of Today's Winning Companies (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922176

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `fa4e986917d437cb1504281e7b986be2698e9507d8feaf426c9d7d1754ca882c` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Fenwick%20et%20al.%20-%202017%20-%20The%20%E2%80%98Unmediated%E2%80%99%20and%20%E2%80%98Tech-Driven%E2%80%99%20Corporate%20Governance%20of%20Today%27s%20Winning%20Companies.pdf

**Failure mode.** stewardship induced payout pressure  (family: short-termism)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** stewardship-codes, buybacks, dividends, short-termism

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