# kaal:claim:2992962-035

**Claim.** The economic incentive for Aragon judges to follow the more popular vote, since judges keep their bond only if they voted with the majority, calls into question whether the mechanism delivers effective, non arbitrary, and fair dispute resolution.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- the Aragon bond and majority reward mechanism, despite anonymous voting

**Source quote.**

> the economic incentives for judges to follow a more popular vote (in the Aragon system judges keep their bond if they voted with the majority), despite the overall anonymity of the voting, may call required notions of effective, non- arbitrary, and fair dispute resolution mechanisms into question.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, *Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution* (2017), 3. Limitations of Existing Solutions, page 53

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Craig Calcaterra, Crypto Transaction Dispute Resolution (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2992962

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `80b92e67594394e38af41b769327936833de8e25d6cf3def966a6ba13bc83d17` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20and%20Calcaterra%20-%202017%20-%20Crypto%20Transaction%20Dispute%20Resolution.pdf

**Failure mode.** majority-reward-incentive-distortion  (family: staking-and-incentive-misalignment)

**Topics.** risk-and-incentives, governance-design, systemic-risk, law-and-legal-systems

**Keywords.** incentive-design, aragon, majority-voting, dispute-resolution

**Related claims.**

- supported_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3782201-026

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.