# kaal:claim:2998097-017

**Claim.** The industry largely absorbed the increased expenses of the Dodd-Frank Act by increasing the use of pass-through expense terms in adviser and fund arrangements, which is why advisers increasingly attributed earnings effects to opportunity costs rather than to expenses between 2012 and 2015.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- 2012 to 2015
- investment adviser and private fund contractual relationships

**Source quote.**

> This was consistent with anecdotal evidence suggesting that the industry largely absorbed the increased expenses associated with the Dodd-Frank Act through the increasing use of pass-through expense terms when structuring investment adviser and private fund relationships between 2012 and 2015.128

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016* (2017), IV.1.d Dodd-Frank Act Comparative Evidence 2012 and 2015, page 31

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `0955054f49c7011d33c285579bb046e6b284e42755b10fd2546a728c202669d5` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202017%20-%20Private%20Investment%20Fund%20Regulation%20-%20Theory%20and%20Empirical%20Evidence%20from%201998%20to%202016.pdf

**Topics.** compliance, economics

**Keywords.** pass-through-expenses, compliance-costs, fund-economics, cost-shifting

**Related claims.**

- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-033
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2732915-038
- extends: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2739479-035

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