# kaal:claim:2998097-029

**Claim.** Since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engaged in investor due diligence partly to protect themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits, rather than in response to regulatory mandate.

**Type.** empirical  **Support.** evidenced

**Holds when.**

- SEC Form ADV Part II filings 2007 to 2014, N=100392
- due diligence litigation record 1995 to 2015, N=572

**Source quote.**

> the data provided in the author's study suggested that since 2010 private fund advisers increasingly engaged in private fund investor due diligence, partially in an effort to protect themselves from investor criticism and lawsuits.163 Since

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016* (2017), IV.3 Private Fund Investor Due Diligence, page 39

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Private Investment Fund Regulation - Theory and Empirical Evidence from 1998 to 2016 (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2998097

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `0955054f49c7011d33c285579bb046e6b284e42755b10fd2546a728c202669d5` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202017%20-%20Private%20Investment%20Fund%20Regulation%20-%20Theory%20and%20Empirical%20Evidence%20from%201998%20to%202016.pdf

**Topics.** law-and-legal-systems, risk-and-incentives, private-funds

**Keywords.** due-diligence, litigation-risk, form-adv, adviser-behavior

**Related claims.**

- restates: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/2811718-035

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