# kaal:claim:3017612-026

**Claim.** Drag-along rights are likely enforceable in Delaware absent fraud or duress, because Delaware rejects the de facto merger doctrine and therefore does not trigger statutory formalities such as appraisal rights.

**Type.** mechanism  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- Delaware corporations
- no fraud or duress

**Source quote.**

> Absent issues of fraud or duress, it seems likely drag-along rights will be enforced for Delaware corporations.84 Because Delaware does not follow the practical merger doctrine, statutory formalities such as appraisal rights are not implicated.

**From.** Wulf A. Kaal, *Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America* (2017), III.2 Shareholders' Agreements on the (Limitation for the) Transfer of Shares, page 12

**Cite as.** Wulf A. Kaal, Shareholder Agreements - National Report of the United States of America (2017). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3017612

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `33821db406f92efbe1698fbaed37687595c13b7ce5463b4a879df679fd4af1ac` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Kaal%20-%202017%20-%20Shareholder%20Agreements%20-%20National%20Report%20of%20the%20United%20States%20of%20America.pdf

**Topics.** institutional-design

**Keywords.** drag-along, delaware, appraisal-rights, de-facto-merger, enforceability

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