# kaal:claim:3125822-017

**Claim.** The author concedes an arbitrage attack is feasible when experts fail to police their expertise and a significant share of the technically fungible tokens is offered on an exchange, since a malicious actor can then buy 51 percent of the tokens, vote against common sense, and sell before the tokens lose value.

**Type.** failure  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- requires expert policing to be absent
- requires a liquid exchange holding a large share of tokens

**Source quote.**

> However, it is feasible that an arbitrage opportunity could evolve if the experts do not police their expertise. If a significant percentage of the (technically fungible) tokens were put on sale in a token exchange, a malicious actor would have the opportunity to 1) buy 51% of tokens

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, *Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A* (2018), 4.1.3 The 51% attack, page 14

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `d4d0bbaa3260968226186131d60e6d64a53e904d94e4295c61fd17042f1191ef` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20et%20al.%20-%202018%20-%20Blockchain%20Infrastructure%20for%20Measuring%20Domain%20Specific%20Reputation%20in%20Autonomous%20Decentralized%20and%20A.pdf

**Failure mode.** buy vote and dump arbitrage  (family: plutocratic-capture)

**Topics.** consensus-and-security, tokenomics

**Keywords.** fifty-one-percent-attack, token-fungibility, arbitrage, policing

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.