# kaal:claim:3125822-020

**Claim.** Even a successful takeover yields the attacker only a fraction of one transaction's fee before the expertise tag topples, so as long as any single fee is smaller than the total reputation there is no incentive to game the system for fees.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- holds while single fees remain small relative to total reputation

**Source quote.**

> The malicious group would merely gain the (fraction) of the fee from one transaction. As long as any single fee is smaller than the total reputation, there is no incentive to game the system for fees.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, *Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A* (2018), 4.1.4 Reputation calculation, page 17

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `d4d0bbaa3260968226186131d60e6d64a53e904d94e4295c61fd17042f1191ef` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20et%20al.%20-%202018%20-%20Blockchain%20Infrastructure%20for%20Measuring%20Domain%20Specific%20Reputation%20in%20Autonomous%20Decentralized%20and%20A.pdf

**Topics.** consensus-and-security, economics, risk-and-incentives

**Keywords.** attack-economics, fee-size, incentive-compatibility, fifty-one-percent-attack

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