# kaal:claim:3125822-022

**Claim.** If good faith experts counter invest at least as fast as the malicious group, that is at a constant fraction c greater than or equal to one of the malicious investment, the malicious group can never gain more than 50 percent of the power.

**Type.** condition  **Support.** argued

**Holds when.**

- requires that good faith experts respond to incoming malicious fees
- requires a time delay in resolving betting pools

**Source quote.**

> assume the good-faith experts invest some constant fraction c of the malicious groups' investment ∆x at each time. If c ≥ 1then the malicious group will never gain more than 50% power.

**From.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, *Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A* (2018), 4.1.4 Reputation calculation, page 17

**Cite as.** Craig Calcaterra, Wulf A. Kaal, Vlad Andrei, Blockchain Infrastructure for Measuring Domain Specific Reputation in Autonomous Decentralized and A (2018). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3125822

**Verify.** sha256 of source PDF `d4d0bbaa3260968226186131d60e6d64a53e904d94e4295c61fd17042f1191ef` at https://raw.githubusercontent.com/wulfkaal/Academic-Papers/main/papers/pdf/Calcaterra%20et%20al.%20-%202018%20-%20Blockchain%20Infrastructure%20for%20Measuring%20Domain%20Specific%20Reputation%20in%20Autonomous%20Decentralized%20and%20A.pdf

**Topics.** consensus-and-security

**Keywords.** counter-investment, attack-cost, formal-model, fifty-one-percent-attack

**Related claims.**

- supported_by: https://wulfkaal.github.io/claims/3125827-037

**Canonical form.** This markdown file is the canonical hashed representation of the claim. Its sha256 is the content hash used for attestation.